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Abstract  
This research-in-progress paper reports on a project that seeks to develop a new process perspective 
on incentive mechanisms in cybercrime prevention networks. Adopting such a view is of great impor-
tance given the continuous innovations in cybercrime that makes fighting it a constant endeavour, in-
volving actors from multiple networks. To this end, we zoom in on specific prevention encounters oc-
curring throughout the process of producing prevention measures, to identify incentive mechanisms 
needed to bring heterogeneous actors together in cybercrime prevention networks. Our longitudinal 
case study of credit card fraud and how it has developed over time resulted in identifying eleven pre-
vention encounters that are critical in the fraud prevention lifecycle. Upon completion of this re-
search, we anticipate to contribute to current literature on security networks in three ways. First, offer 
a new understanding on incentive mechanisms that accounts for the role of contextual conditions in 
shaping these incentives. Second, add diversity to research methods used to study incentives by adopt-
ing a qualitative case study approach. Third, we shed more light on the role of technology in building 
incentive mechanisms in cybercrime prevention networks. 
Keywords: cybercrime, IS security, networks, incentives, credit card, credit card fraud, prevention 
encounters, extra-organizational settings 
 
1 Introduction 
Cybercrime comes with significant cost. It is estimated that the global economic cost of cybercrime 
can reach up to $400 billion (McAfee, 2014). This makes the phenomenon a serious problem (Chung 
et al., 2006), not least since there is little sign that the fight against cybercrime beats the emergence of 
new types of crime (Hunton, 2009). 
Besides its economic challenges, the threat of cybercrime rises from its networked nature. Today‟s 
interconnected business environment increases organizations‟ vulnerability to security attacks (Dhillon 
and Backhouse, 2001, Straub and Welke, 1998) as security is no longer confined by organizational 
boundaries but transcends them to be dependent on all those operating on the same network (Anderson 
and Moore, 2006, Zhao et al., 2013). As an example, the well-known Target security breach was not 
caused by insufficient security controls from the retailer‟s side, but rather from a deficiency in one of 
its contractor security system.  
The origins of security threats are thus manifold (Mookerjee et al., 2011, Smith et al., 2007); as organ-
izations seek to fix one loophole another emerges. This makes security attacks exceed a single organi-
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zation‟s capability of fighting them (Gupta and Zhdanov, 2012, Kunreuther and Heal, 2003, Smith et 
al., 2007). Hence, IS security is no longer only a matter of organizational processes (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010, Posey et al., 2013, Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010, Siponen, 2000, Straub, 1990), but is also ex-
panded to include extra-organizational settings (Straub et al., 2008, Whittington, 2006) that recognize 
the open systems organizations operate in (Katz and Kahn, 1966, Kast and Rosenzwe, 1972). Studying 
organizations from a “population of organizations” perspective therefore might be more insightful and 
offer new knowledge in comparison to a “single organization” view (Aldrich, 1971) .We focus on ex-
tra-organizational settings and use this concept to refer to the wider context that exists outside organi-
zational boundaries where organizations get involved in information and resource sharing in order to 
better secure their systems. Therefore, we envisage security efforts rising from multiple actors who 
come together (converge) and form networks, and define networks of cybercrime prevention as collec-
tive efforts pursued by distributed actors operating on the same network, whether directly or indirect-
ly, to develop or adopt different measures to maintain the security of their network.  
Adopting this network perspective on cybercrime prevention brings forward a focal question of the 
incentives necessary to ensure enrollment and active involvement of the network various actors. IS 
security literature identifies different incentives schemes used to align actors‟ interests in security net-
works, those range from rewards and subsidies to liability and cost sharing (Cavusoglu et al., 2008, 
Liu et al., 2014, Gal-Or and Ghose, 2005, Hui et al., 2012). Despite offering valuable knowledge, this 
literature tends to study incentives through static models (Cezar et al., 2014, August and Tunca, 2011). 
As security threats (Hunton, 2009) and actors‟ interests evolve over time (Kaplan and Henderson, 
2005), incentive mechanisms are expected to change to adjust to such transformations (August and 
Tunca, 2011). A process view on incentives is therefore expected to provide richer understanding on 
incentive mechanisms needed to prevent cybercrime. This is of great importance given the diversity of 
actors required to fight the plethora of cybercrime emerging every day. 
This research-in-progress seeks to answer the question of what are the incentive mechanisms for con-
verging heterogeneous actors to develop and adopt prevention measures to fight cybercrime? To ad-
dress this question, we are conducting a case study of credit card fraud as it has developed over the 
past fifty years. This historical coverage enables us to observe and trace changes in incentives coincid-
ing with different prevention measures, and examine how contextual conditions shape incentive struc-
tures. We focus on specific prevention encounters between actors that shake an established pattern of 
how cybercrime is prevented. These encounters are identified and explored using a qualitative, histori-
cal case (Mason et al., 1997). The data was collected from multiple sources: trade publications, journal 
articles, books, industry reports, and legal and government documents. 
This research seeks to offer a number of contributions. First, we develop a new process perspective on 
incentive mechanisms in cybercrime prevention networks. Second, we enrich the literature that ex-
amines incentives through analytical models based on rational choice by offering an empirical qualita-
tive study on incentives. Further, our historical research approach provides diversity needed in IS se-
curity research (Siponen, 2005). Third, we shed more light on technology as a crucial player in cyber-
crime prevention networks that has been understudied, and examine its role in building needed incen-
tive mechanisms.  
The paper proceeds with an overview of incentives for collective effort in cybercrime prevention, fol-
lowed by our framing of incentive mechanisms in cybercrime prevention networks. We then describe 
our research design and method, and end with preliminary findings and conclusion. 
2 Incentives for Collective effort in Cybercrime Prevention 
The spread of security breaches across organizations from different sectors shifted security efforts to 
emphasize the importance of collaboration to halt the progression of the phenomenon (Gal-Or and 
Ghose, 2005, Gupta and Zhdanov, 2012). Collective effort to prevent cybercrime is evident in the 
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emergence of various security networks
1 
that aim to harness the effort of various actors to build a 
secure environment. Such networks include; Information Sharing and Analysis Center, such as 
Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and Vulnerability Disclosure Networks, 
as Computer Emergency Response Team and iDefense. 
There are different motives for actors to contribute
2  
to collective effort towards security. Cost savings 
is a dominant incentive in cybercrime prevention networks. Security is expensive; the complexity of 
technological solutions, the need for professional security staff, along with external pressure to meet 
certain security requirements (such as Payment Card Industry Standards), make security exceed 
allocated budget (Hui et al., 2012). To alleviate part of this high costs, organizations participate in 
security networks where they save costs either directly through passing security functions to 
specialized service providers, taking advantage of their economies of scale (Schechter and Smith, 
2003, Cezar et al., 2010). Or indirectly by receiving information that makes their security 
investment more targeted (Gal-Or and Ghose, 2005). For instance, information regarding a 
particular vulnerability in software X (e.g. firewall, intrusion detection system) may cause an 
organization to reconsider its security investment and shift to another more secure product, 
eliminating by this unnecessary costs. Having access to security breach incidents enables the 
application of quick prevention measures that protect organizations from falling into the same 
security trap and costs associated with that. Organizations are increasingly looking at security 
networks as a way to substitute high investment in security and reduce overall costs (Gordon 
et al., 2003, Hausken, 2007). 
Increasing demands is another incentive for participating in security networks. Operating in today‟s 
competitive business environment, organizations seek to be more alert to actions competitors take and 
the different strategies to maintain or increase their market share; security networks offer such an 
opportunity. Sharing information about security status opens a window for organizations to increase 
their sales due to demand spillover (Gal-Or and Ghose, 2005; Cezar et al. 2010). A technical flaw in 
one company‟s product may shift demand to competitor‟s product increasing by this its profits. 
Organizations that believe security networks can increase demands on their products are more inclined  
to get involved in these networks. 
Organizations security actions have a major impact on their reputation and market value (Yayla and 
Hu, 2011, Cavusoglu et al., 2007). By participating in security networks where organizations 
collaborate and share best security practices, organizations signal their commitment to security, and 
emphasize their responsibility towards their stakeholders (Gal-Or and Ghose, 2005), relieving by this 
customers anxiety regarding the security of their personal information and maintaining their trust. In 
addition, joining such collective effort indicates that security threats once identified, rapid corrective 
actions will follow, decreasing the value of the threat and making organizations less attractive to 
attackers (Ransbotham et al., 2012, Schechter and Smith, 2003, Gupta and Zhdanov, 2012, Kannan 
and Telang, 2005). Organizations thus benefit from the different signals they send when becoming part 
of security networks, which give them incentives not only to join these networks but also to be active 
members as well. For instance, software vendors‟ fear of the impact discovered vulnerabilities in their 
products might have on the quality perceived of their overall services gives them more inclination to 
supply their clients with corrective patches in a timely manner (Arora et al., 2010). 
 
 
1
 In this paper, security networks and cybercrime prevention networks are used interchangeably. 
2
 Contributing to collective effort include both participating in security networks and active involvement to attain 
security in these networks. 
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Liability for security breaches is a recognized approach to drive genuine security efforts in security 
networks (August and Tunca, 2011; Liu et al., 2014), and a reason why some organizations decide to 
join these networks (Zhao et al., 2013). Liability policies, which are often incorporated in service level 
agreements and membership rules, put more pressure on the responsible party by increasing the cost of 
security in case of failure to meet specified conditions, stimulating better security behaviour. At the 
same time, liability can be seen by some as an opportunity to transfer security risks to other actors 
giving them further motivations to participate in security networks. Besides benefits from accumulated 
knowledge and expertise, organizations outsource their security functions to move liability burden 
from themselves to the outsourcer (Rowe, 2007). 
3 A Process View on Incentive Mechanisms in Cybercrime Pre-
vention Networks 
Current literature shows that if collective effort to prevent cybercrime is to survive, it is the incentives 
that bring actors together that have to be ensured. Despite the valuable knowledge this literature gives 
on incentives to explain why actors decide to contribute to collective effort, we argue that our knowl-
edge of incentives is derived from a limited and static view on collective effort to prevent cybercrime, 
which confine the phenomenon to pre-existing security networks, such as CERT and FS-ISAC, and 
examine relationships between actors through predefined set of variables (Mohr, 1982), for instance 
the impact of security costs on incentives to share security information, or vulnerabilities‟ severity on 
speed of releasing patches, which may deviate when confronting real-life situations (Cowen, 1998). 
Little is known therefore about the process of collective effort to prevent cybercrime, that is, how ac-
tors come together to prevent cybercrime by developing and adopting prevention measures over time, 
and the underlying incentive mechanisms. This is very crucial given the fact that security is a moving 
target (Mookerjee et al., 2011) where no single prevention measure is sufficient to prevent a certain 
cybercrime, such as credit card fraud, from occurring. Collective effort for cybercrime prevention is 
thus a continuous process that involves heterogeneous actors (Choo, 2011) with diverse interests that 
change over time (Kaplan and Henderson 2005). Without the ability to explain how and why actors 
continuously converge to prevent cybercrime, our knowledge of incentive mechanisms is incomplete 
(Schelling, 1998). In addition, despite showing the importance of multiple agents in IS security, we 
note that existing literature tends to shy away from studying technology as a crucial player in prevent-
ing cybercrime. The socio-organizational aspect of IS security cannot be undermined, nonetheless how 
technology is interwoven in it is also important (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001, Ransbotham and 
Mitra, 2009). 
Knowledge of processes and events taking place while preventing cybercrime is thus crucial to explain 
how and why actors come together to build a secure environment (Ransbotham et al.2012), and how 
consequences of certain actions direct future prevention efforts (Zhao et al., 2013; Mookerjee et al. 
2011).We will obtain this knowledge by zooming on in specific prevention encounters (Newman and 
Robey, 1992) that reflect actions taken by heterogeneous actors to develop and adopt prevention 
measures that shake an established pattern. By this, we focus on critical events that had significant 
impact on how cybercrime is prevented, and the dynamisms associated with the prevention processes, 
allowing us to better capture the complexity of the phenomenon (David, 2003). Through following 
these prevention encounters over time, we acknowledge the dynamic nature of both cybercrime 
(Mookerjee et al., 2011) and incentive mechanisms (August and Tunca, 2011, Cavusoglu et al., 2008). 
The former by considering a collective of prevention measures rather than a single one and the latter 
by examining different contextual conditions where incentives are enacted. 
Prevention encounters represent „windows of opportunity‟ (Tyre and Orlikowski, 1994) for rethinking 
current security practices and how cybercrime is prevented. By this, they challenge an established 
process (Isabella, 1990), and force actors to re-evaluate the effectiveness of existing prevention meas-
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ures and negotiate possible future directions (Bettenhausen and Murnighan, 1985). Such interruptions 
in cybercrime prevention do not come out of thin air; rather they rise from certain events that trigger 
changes in prevention measures. We refer to these events as prevention encounters triggers, and use 
the concept to denote to changes in prevention measures due to elements of technology, laws, social 
pressure, and/or economics (Lessig, 1999). First, the continuous advancements in information tech-
nology make it crucial in ensuring information security and confidentiality. This is seen not only 
through technologies specifically developed to meet this purpose such as cryptography, but also in 
technologies developed in another domain but find themselves new applications in IS security field 
(Levinthal, 1998). Second, laws are associated with regulatory bodies‟ responsibility towards the pub-
lic perceived in regulations they enact to protect and maximize the social welfare of a society (Blind, 
2012). In doing this, laws can change organizations‟ institutional environment and market mechanisms 
(Haveman et al., 2001), which in turn impact organizations‟ current and future security plans. For in-
stance, by mandating public announcement of security breach incidents, security breach notification 
laws attempt to put more pressure on organizations to implement better security controls (Winn, 
2009). Third, social pressure stems from organizations‟ moral and social responsibility towards their 
stakeholders (Culnan and Williams, 2009). It entails the voice of external groups who are affected by 
organization‟s actions and exert pressure towards more security. Those groups manifest themselves in 
various forms such as, general public or society groups that advocate consumers‟ privacy rights 
(Benston, 1982), or industry groups who seek to draw attention to the severity of a particular pheno-
menon (Huber, 1991) and the threat it poses on their social and economic fitness (Oliver, 1991). Last-
ly, economics of information security refer to the cost-benefit trade-off that influence investments lev-
el in IS security (Gordon and Loeb, 2002). 
4 Research Methods 
To develop a process view on incentive mechanisms in cybercrime prevention networks, we chose to 
use a case study approach. Specifically, we will use a historical case study as longitudinal data enrich 
process oriented research (Markus and Robey, 1988). Moreover, history is deemed an essential ele-
ment for understanding present situations and drawing future strategies (Kaplan and Orlikowski, 
2013). Longitudinal data reveals “movements from continuity to change and vice versa” (Pettigrew, 
1990, p.272) which is consistent with our notion of prevention encounters as critical change opportuni-
ties for prevention measures. Our case study approach can be best described as a structured and fo-
cused one with emphasis on process-tracing (George and Bennett, 2005). That is, it is structured and 
guided by our question of identifying incentive mechanisms in cybercrime prevention networks, and 
focused in terms that from the voluminous data available on the selected case, we only zoom in on the 
prevention encounters aspect of the phenomenon. As prevention encounters are often associated with 
different prevention measures, subcases of our general case (Ragin, 1992) can be derived (each pre-
vention encounter is considered a subcase) enabling us to conduct both within and cross-case analysis 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) to gain deeper understanding of each prevention encounter and identify patterns 
across them that can explain how actors are induced to contribute to cybercrime prevention. 
The case of credit card fraud is selected to generate a process view on incentive mechanisms in cyber-
crime prevention networks due to a number of reasons. First, the heterogeneity of actors involved in 
the credit card industry (technology, banks, regulatory agencies, merchants, and customers) and the 
complexity of their relationships (Lablebici, 2012), make the case „prevention encounters rich‟ where 
through these encounters actors try to motivate the production of prevention measures. Second, statis-
tics show that cybercrime is aimed more toward achieving financial gains, and financial sector is 
among the top sectors exposed to cybercrime incidents (Choo, 2011, Symantec, 2009). Third, the 
number of credit card usage in offline and online transactions is in continuous growth (Capgemini and 
RBS, 2013), making credit cards an indispensable technology in our daily lives. Fourth, credit cards 
are considered the technology that ignited electronic value exchange (Naar and Stein, 1975), by under- 
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Figure 1. Flowchart showing general and focused search processes. 
 
standing its case we can draw further implications on incentive mechanisms necessary to face security 
threats rising from continuous innovations in digital payments.  
Credit card industry is hence the focus of our research where we will specifically examine the case of 
Visa credit card to explore the different prevention encounters the company was involved in to build 
and maintain secure credit card transactions.  
4.1 Data Collection and Analysis 
Data was collected from multiple sources: trade journals, industry reports, books, journal articles, and 
legal and government documents. This allowed us to structure events in credit card fraud in a timeline 
and observe how they influence subsequent events (Langley, 1999). 
Data collection went through two main steps: general and focused search (see Figure 1). General 
search, using a broad keyword (credit card fraud), aimed to identify key events (those that encapsulate 
prevention encounters) using prevention encounters triggers, and build a timeline of these events. 
Through general search we also identified major data sources to be used in our focused search. The 
American Banker Journal and ABA Banking Journal were identified the top data sources that are often 
cited in research targeting credit card industry. The company‟s biography “Visa the Power of an Idea” 
as well as its founder‟s biography “Birth of the Chaordic Age” were also among the highly cited 
books. Though these last two sources might be biased to favour the company‟s side, our main purpose 
was identifying key events and time of their occurrences, and those were further corroborated by data  
Focused 
search 
General 
search 
DB search using keyword 
“credit card fraud” n=2178 
Apply DB built-in limiters to only include out-
put related to research topic (Ex. Limit Subject 
to those in: credit card fraud, identity theft, in-
ternet fraud, data protection, banking-industry 
security measures) 
Output reviewed n=476 
Search data sources using 
keywords that represent 
key events 
Prevention encounters DB 
Additional data sources identified to collect 
detailed data and identify key events (Ex. The 
American Banker newspaper, ABA Banking 
Journal, Visa‟s bibliography „Visa the power of 
an idea‟, HathiTrust digital library (to access 
congressional hearings records)) 
Specific key words: mass mailing, BASE, 
magnetic stripe, magstripe, POS terminals, 
smart cards, neural networks, SET, verified by 
Visa, account truncation, PCI DSS, tokeniza-
tion 
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Table 1. Data collection and analysis process. 
collected from other sources. “Electronic Value Exchange: Origins of the Visa Electronic Payment 
System” was a valuable source with rich data on Visa‟s use of technology to prevent fraud with useful 
insights on the associated encounters. 
In focused search we sought to collect detailed data on prevention encounters, and the underlying in-
centives around the development and adoption of various prevention measures. So far, we have identi-
fied 11 prevention encounters that are considered critical in preventing credit card fraud. As the analy-
sis process continues, gaps may be identified that require further data collection which might add to 
our prevention encounters database. 
Coding prevention encounters will go through two cycles of coding (Miles et al., 2014). The first cycle 
of coding involves open coding to generate general descriptive codes regarding prevention encounters, 
which will then be used to discover patterns and categories within these codes (second cycle) to iden-
tify incentive mechanisms for collective action in preventing cybercrime, how they adjust to their con-
text, and whether they differ across prevention encounters. 
Table 1 summarizes the data collection and analysis process. 
5 Preliminary Findings and Conclusion 
Our preliminary analysis shows that cybercrime prevention is a continuous process of negotiation and 
conflict resolution, where incentive mechanisms are essentially about mobilizing and recruiting actors 
to one‟s side to win the negotiation. Further, the interdependencies in this process create a chain of 
incentives where recruiting one actor is necessary to recruit another. As we formalize our analysis, we 
expect to identify and classify incentive mechanisms necessary in cybercrime prevention networks; 
this can have important implications for policy makers on what strategies to pursue under which con-
dition when fighting this phenomenon. 
This research argues that adopting a process view in preventing cybercrime is very crucial given the 
fact that cybercrime is increasing in intensity and evolving in nature (Hunton, 2009), making the mul-
Steps  Tasks  Outputs  
1. General database 
search 
a. Search Business Source Premier using keywords as 
“credit card fraud”. 
b. Output screening through database built-in filtration 
criteria, and title and abstract review.  
Database of case materials 
2. Identifying key 
events 
a. Use prevention encounters triggers to identify key 
events in the case materials. 
b. Extract prevention encounters from key events. 
c. Identify major data sources. 
a. Chronology of key 
events. 
b. List of major data 
sources. 
3. Focused database 
search 
a. Search database using specific keywords as “POS 
terminals”, “magnetic stripe”, “smart card”. 
b. Use identified data sources in collecting further data. 
a. Data that enrich our 
understanding of pre-
vention encounters. 
b. Prevention encounters 
database 
4. Coding process a. First cycle coding that summarizes prevention en-
counters into descriptive codes. 
b. Second cycle coding to identify patterns and catego-
ries within descriptive codes. 
a. A list of descriptive 
codes. 
b. A list of pattern 
codes. 
5. Identifying in-
centive mechan-
isms 
a. Analyze patterns to elicit incentive mechanisms. 
b. Identify incentive mechanisms in cybercrime pre-
vention networks. 
Incentive mechanisms for 
collective action in cyber-
crime prevention 
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tiplicity of prevention measures and the heterogeneity of actors involved a natural consequence. By 
tracing prevention encounters over time, we will be able to reveal the process by which actors con-
verge to prevent cybercrime and the incentive mechanisms necessary for their convergence. In addi-
tion, our networks perspective aim to stress the importance of distributed agency in IS security and 
encourage future research to go beyond studying security within organizational context and consider 
extra-organizational settings to enrich our understanding of the various aspects affecting this pheno-
menon. Lastly, we hope that our concept of prevention encounters, which views cybercrime preven-
tion as a result of disruptive processes, create interests among researchers and serve as a building 
block for future IS security research. 
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